Vendor Compensation as an Approach for State  Amazon  Laws: Part 1 by Gamage, David & Heckman, Devin J.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2012
Vendor Compensation as an Approach for State
"Amazon" Laws: Part 1
David Gamage
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dgamage@indiana.edu
Devin J. Heckman
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the E-Commerce Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gamage, David and Heckman, Devin J., "Vendor Compensation as an Approach for State "Amazon" Laws: Part 1" (2012). Articles by
Maurer Faculty. 2433.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2433
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126198
Vendor Compensation as an Approach
For State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Part 1
by David Gamage and Devin J. Heckman
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an explosion in
revenues from electronic commerce (or, ‘‘e-
commerce’’),1 just as U.S. state governments have
suffered severe budget shortfalls due to the financial
crisis and ensuing recession.2 Yet because of a 1992
Supreme Court decision — Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota — major interstate e-commerce vendors
have been effectively exempt from state sales and
use taxes.3 The rapid growth of e-commerce has thus
eroded the states’ sales and use tax bases, depriving
the states of much-needed revenue.4
Quill held that states can impose the burden of
collecting sales and use taxes only on vendors that
have a physical presence within the taxing state.5
The taxpayer in Quill was a mail-order catalog
vendor, but the holding applies equally to interstate
e-commerce.6 Recently, several states have passed
legislation aggressively interpreting Quill’s physical
presence requirement in an attempt to reach out-of-
state e-commerce vendors.7 Commonly referred to as
‘‘Amazon’’ laws,8 those statutes have taken several
forms, such as imputing physical presence when a
1E-commerce constituted 7 percent of all retail sales in
2010, and this share is expected to grow rapidly over the
coming years. See, e.g., ‘‘Online Retail Sales,’’ National Retail
Foundation, http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Pages&
sp_id=1240 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
2See, e.g., Elizabeth McNichol, Phil Oliff, and Nicholas
Johnson, ‘‘States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact,’’ Cen-
ter on Budget and Policy Priorities (2011), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf (estimating the states’
total budget shortfall to be $103 billion).
3Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309-319
(1992).
4Annual national state and local sales tax losses on
e-commerce are predicted to total $11.4 billion in 2012 and to
continue growing rapidly thereafter. Donald Bruce, William
Fox, and LeAnn Luna, ‘‘State and Local Sales Tax Revenue
Losses From E-Commerce,’’ State Tax Notes, May 18, 2009, p.
537, Doc 2009-8902, or 2009 STT 94-1.
5Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-318.
6Walter Hellerstein, ‘‘State Taxation of Electronic Com-
merce,’’ 52 Tax L. Rev. 425, 437 (1997).
7For further discussion, see infra.
8Amazon is both the leading Internet retailer and has been
among the most aggressive in combating the states’ attempts
to tax interstate e-commerce. Dale Kasler, ‘‘Amazon Takes on
California Over Sales Tax,’’ The Sacramento Bee, July 17,
2011, at 1A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2011/07/17/v-
print/3774593/amazon-takes-on-california-over.html.
David Gamage is assistant professor, University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall). Devin J.
Heckman received a JD from the school in 2011.
This article is the first of a two-part adaptation of a
previously published article: David Gamage and Devin J.
Heckman, ‘‘A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of
E-Commerce,’’ 92 B. U. L. Rev. 483 (2012). It is published
here with permission.
The authors want to thank Pat Cain, Heather Field,
Brian Galle, Mark Gergen, Andy Haile, David Hasen,
Calvin Johnson, Sarah Lawsky, Michael Mazerov, John
McNulty, Susie Morse, Katie Pratt, Randle Pollard, Eric
Rakowski, Shruti Rana, Darien Shanske, Daniel Simmons,
Kirk Stark, John Swain, Dennis Ventry, Edward Zelinsky,
and the other participants in the 2011 AALS Hot Topics
panel on ‘‘Taxing Internet Sales: The Battle Between States
and Retailers,’’ the fall 2011 Northern California Tax
Roundtable, and the 2011 National Tax Association Annual
Conference panel on the ‘‘Federal Influence on State Taxa-
tion: Description and Prescription.’’
State Tax Notes, August 6, 2012 385
(C) Tax Analysts 2012. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126198
remote vendor has sales affiliates within a state9 or
attributing physical presence whenever a remote
vendor licenses trademarks to an in-state firm.10
Although litigation remains ongoing, many com-
mentators have concluded that the recent state
Amazon laws will prove unconstitutional, ineffec-
tive, or both.11 Even if courts allow the states to
stretch the definition of physical presence to include
affiliations with in-state firms, major e-commerce
vendors like Amazon can respond by simply termi-
nating those relationships in order to retain their
sales and use tax exemption.12
At the same time, Quill has been widely criti-
cized. The case was recently nominated for ‘‘the most
maligned Supreme Court tax decision.’’13 Numerous
commentators have called for the Court to revisit
the decision14 or for Congress to pass legislation
enabling the states to tax out-of-state e-commerce
vendors.15 It seems that an academic consensus has
developed against the Quill framework for govern-
ing when state sales and use taxes can reach inter-
state e-commerce.16
In this article, the first of a two-part series, we
argue that the existing approaches used by state
Amazon laws are unlikely to be effective in taxing
interstate e-commerce vendors. In the process, we
survey the constitutional and statutory landscapes
surrounding the application of sales and use taxes to
interstate e-commerce transactions. In particular,
we focus on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Quill
and related cases, the recent legislative attempts by
several states to capture lost revenue by passing
Amazon laws, and the compromises that have been
brokered in their wakes.
The existing approaches used by
state Amazon laws are unlikely to
be effective in taxing interstate
e-commerce vendors.
In our companion article, the second in the series,
we will build on that foundation by outlining a new
approach that states might employ for taxing inter-
state e-commerce, based on adequately compensat-
ing remote vendors for all tax compliance costs.17 Yet
9See, e.g., N.Y. Tax Law section 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney
Supp. 2011); see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation and Fin.,
‘‘New Presumption Applicable to Definition of Sales Tax
Vendor,’’ TSB-M-08(3)S (May 8, 2008); Michael R. Gordon,
‘‘Up the Amazon Without a Paddle: Examining Sales Taxes,
Entity Isolation, and the ‘Affiliate Tax,’’’ 11 N.C. J.L. & Tech.
299, 309 (2010).
10See, e.g., Ala. Code 40-23-190(a)(2) (2003); HB 3659, 95th
Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘Lob-
bying Congress: ‘Amazon’ Laws in the Lands of Lincoln and
Mt. Rushmore,’’ State Tax Notes, May 23, 2011, p. 557, Doc
2011-7795, or 2011 STT 99-3.
11See, e.g., Stephen P. Kranz, Diann L. Smith, and Beth
Freeman, ‘‘Colorado’s End Run: Clever, Coercive, and Uncon-
stitutional,’’ State Tax Notes, Apr. 5, 2010, p. 55, Doc 2010-
6640, or 2010 STT 64-9 (maintaining that Colorado’s Amazon
law is unconstitutional); Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘New York’s
‘Amazon’ Law: Constitutional but Unwise,’’ State Tax Notes,
Dec. 7, 2009, p. 715, Doc 2009-24938, or 2009 STT 232-1
[hereinafter Zelinsky, ‘‘New York’s ‘Amazon’ Law’’] (arguing
that New York’s Amazon law is ineffective); Edward A. Zelin-
sky, ‘‘The Siren Song of ‘Amazon’ Laws: The Colorado Ex-
ample,’’ State Tax Notes, Mar. 7, 2011, p. 695, Doc 2011-3777,
or 2011 STT 44-2 [hereinafter Zelinsky, ‘‘The Siren Song’’]
(claiming that Colorado’s Amazon law is unconstitutional).
12Major e-commerce vendors have already ended many of
their relationships with affiliates in states that have passed
Amazon laws, and they can be expected to terminate their
remaining affiliations if they lose in litigation over the defini-
tion of physical presence. E.g., Dale Kasler, ‘‘California Affili-
ates Hurt by Tax Bill TargetingAmazon.com,’’The Sacramento
Bee, July 7, 2011, at 1A, available at http://www.sacbee
.com/2011/07/07/3752677/california-affiliates-hurt-by.html.
(‘‘Hoping to exempt itself from the law, Amazon has fired its
10,000 California affiliates, cutting off their commissions.
Scores of other e-commerce companies affected by the law,
including Overstock.com and a slew of smaller firms, have done
the same.’’).
13Paul L. Caron, ‘‘Pepperdine Hosts Symposium on the
Most Maligned Supreme Court Decisions,’’ Tax Prof. L. Blog
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/
04/supreme-mistakes.html.
14See, e.g., David Brunori, ‘‘It’s Time to Overturn Quill,’’
State Tax Notes, Feb. 15, 2010, p. 497, Doc 2010-2948, or 2010
STT 30-2; Arthur R. Rosen and Matthew P. Hedstrom, ‘‘Quill
— Stare at the Decision,’’ State Tax Notes, June 27, 2011, p.
931, Doc 2011-11848, or 2011 STT 123-2 (‘‘Indeed, many have
expressed and continue to express an interest in ‘overturning’
Quill.’’ (footnote omitted)).
15E.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘New York Appellate Division
Upholds ‘Amazon’ Law: Analysis,’’ State Tax Notes, Jan. 10,
2011, p. 93, Doc 2011-26057, or 2011 STT 6-1. Because the
Quill decision was decided on dormant commerce clause
grounds, states are barred from taxing out-of-state vendors
only in the absence of congressional action authorizing that
taxation.
16Walter Hellerstein, ‘‘Deconstructing the Debate over
State Taxation of Electronic Commerce,’’ 13 Harv. J.L. &
Tech. 549, 549-550 (2000). (‘‘There is a broad consensus
among academic tax specialists regarding the general prin-
ciples that should guide any effort to deal with sales and use
taxation of electronic commerce. . . . Remote sales, including
electronic commerce, should, to the extent possible, be taxed
by the state of destination of sales, regardless of whether the
vendor has a physical presence in the state.’’).
Indeed, even those who praise Quill do so primarily on the
grounds that Congress, not the courts, is the proper actor for
specifying how the states should be able to tax interstate.
Hence, even most of the ‘‘praise’’ for the case does not
necessarily support the continuation of the physical presence
rule for governing when states should be able to subject
remote vendors to their sales and use taxes. e.g., Rosen and
Hedstrom, supra note 14, at 936.
17David Gamage and Devin J. Heckman, ‘‘Vendor Compen-
sation as an Approach for State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Part 2, Our
Proposed Solution.’’ State Tax Notes [forthcoming].
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before we can outline our proposed approach for
state Amazon laws, we must first survey the current
landscape.
Quill and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Taxation of E-Commerce
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia
levy sales taxes.18 As corollaries to those sales taxes,
the states also impose use taxes.19 Use taxes apply
when a state resident purchases nonexempt goods or
services for use within the state for which sales
taxes have not been paid.20
In most states, individuals are responsible for
paying use taxes on any e-commerce goods they
purchase for which the e-commerce vendor did not
previously remit sales or use taxes.21 Hence, if state
residents generally paid the use taxes they owed on
e-commerce purchases, there would be no problem
with state taxation of e-commerce, because the
states’ inability to levy sales or use taxes on
e-commerce vendors would be remedied by the resi-
dents instead paying use taxes on these purchases.
States have found it nearly impossible, however, to
collect use taxes from individual residents.22 Accord-
ingly, when states are unable to impose use tax
reporting or collection duties on vendors, use tax
compliance is very low.23
The Supreme Court decided two cases in 1944
that created divergent constitutional rules for sales
taxes and use taxes.24 In McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth
Co.,25 the Court ruled that an Arkansas sales tax
could not be applied to goods sold by traveling
salespersons residing in Tennessee who solicited
orders in Arkansas in person, by mail, or by tele-
phone.26 On the same day, the Court held in General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission that an Iowa
use tax could be levied on orders solicited through
traveling salespersons residing in Minnesota.27 The
facts of those two cases were nearly identical, with
the different outcomes turning solely on whether the
retailer or the purchaser was obligated to collect and
remit the tax.28 Together, those two cases estab-
lished a dichotomy between sales and use taxes that
remains in effect to this day: Purchases that occur
within a state may be subject to sales taxation while
purchases from remote vendors may only be subject
to use taxation.29
The remainder of this part analyzes the constitu-
tional limitations on a state’s ability to impose use
tax compliance duties on remote vendors. These
limitations arise from the due process clause of the
14th Amendment and from the dormant commerce
clause. In brief, the due process clause requires only
‘‘some definite link, some minimum connection, be-
tween a state and the person, property or transac-
tion’’ that the state seeks to tax or regulate.30 In
contrast, the dormant commerce clause broadly in-
validates state legislation that has a ‘‘burdening
effect upon [interstate] commerce.’’31 State regula-
tion and taxation of interstate commerce must sat-
isfy both clauses to be constitutionally permissible,
but typically it is the dormant commerce clause that
invalidates them.
A. The Due Process Clause
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides the baseline restriction on a state’s
ability to subject out-of-state vendors to sales and
use taxation. More generally, the due process clause
places a floor on the amount of connection that is
required between a state and an out-of-state entity
before the state may tax or regulate its conduct.
18Walter Hellerstein, Kirk J. Stark, John A. Swain, and
Joan M. Youngman, State and Local Taxation: Cases and
Materials 607 (9th ed. 2009); 1 Richard D. Pomp and Oliver
Oldman, State and Local Taxation, section 6-2 (5th ed. 2005)
(‘‘The only states still without a sales tax are Delaware, New
Hampshire, Montana, Oregon, and Alaska.’’); John L. Mike-
sell, ‘‘State Sales Taxes in 2010: Collections Still in Reces-
sion,’’ State Tax Notes, June 6, 2011, p. 709, Doc 2011-9541, or
2011 STT 108-6.
19Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 665. (‘‘To backstop their sales
taxes, the states and localities imposing them also levy use
taxes if a resident makes a retail purchase but fails to pay
sales tax on the purchase.’’)
20Id.; see also ‘‘Use Tax,’’ Wash. St. Department of Revenue,
http://dor.wa.gov/content/findtaxesandrates/usetax/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2012).
21Id.
22Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘‘Sales and Use Taxes on Elec-
tronic Commerce: Legal, Economic, Administrative, and Po-
litical Issues,’’ 34 Urb. Law. 487, 489 (2002). (‘‘Use taxes are
the legal liability of purchasers. With two exceptions — for
automobiles and other products that must be registered to be
used in the state and for purchases by business that can be
audited — tax is likely to be paid only if vendors collect it.’’)
Most state residents appear to be unaware that they even owe
use taxes on goods purchased from out-of-state e-commerce
vendors. ‘‘The Amazon War: More Complicated Than the
Boston Tea Party, but Potentially as Colorful,’’ The Economist,
July 23-29, 2011, at 28. (‘‘In theory, consumers are supposed
to keep receipts and pay so-called ‘use taxes’, but few people
have ever heard of them.’’)
23John A. Swain, ‘‘Cybertaxation and the Commerce
Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus?’’ 75 S. Cal. L. Rev.
419, 428 n.53 (2002).
24The discussion in this paragraph follows prior work by
John Swain. Id. at 427-429.
25322 U.S. 327 (1944).
26Id. at 331.
27322 U.S. 335 (1944).
28Swain, supra note 23, at 428.
29Id.
30Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1991)
(quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-345
(1954)).
31Id. (quothing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322
U.S. 340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
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That floor cannot be modified by a state or by
Congress.32 This test has been formulated in a
variety of ways, but the touchstone is generally
accepted to be ‘‘whether a defendant’s contacts with
the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of Government, to require it to de-
fend [a] suit in that State.’’33
The Supreme Court has taken several opportuni-
ties to clarify the amount of contact required by the
due process clause. For instance, the Court has
ruled that soliciting sales from a state’s residents
through independent contractors is sufficient con-
tact to satisfy due process.34 More broadly, the
Court’s modern due process jurisprudence allows
states to reach out-of-state actors who ‘‘purposefully
avail’’ themselves of the state’s economic market.35
Modern due process jurisprudence thus imposes a
light burden on a state’s ability to exercise jurisdic-
tion over out-of-staters that do business within a
state. In contrast, for some time, it was unclear
whether a state could, consistent with the due
process clause, exercise power over mail-order re-
tailers that had no physical presence in that state.
Previous due process case law had focused on the
requirement that persons subjected to a state’s
power had a ‘‘presence’’ in that state; the shift to
testing based on ‘‘minimum contacts’’ and ‘‘purpose-
ful availment’’ thus created uncertainty that was
ultimately resolved by the Quill decision.
In Quill, the Court decisively ruled that physical
presence is unnecessary under the due process
clause and that the due process clause does not bar
states from subjecting vendors who conduct a sig-
nificant amount of sales within a state to the state’s
use tax. The Quill case involved North Dakota suing
a remote mail-order vendor for unpaid use taxes on
its sales to North Dakota residents.36 The vendor in
Quill owned no tangible property in the state and
had no employees there, but it did sell almost $1
million worth of merchandise to about 3,000 North
Dakotans.37 The Court upheld the tax, concluding,
‘‘There is no question that Quill has purposefully
directed its activities at North Dakota residents,
that the magnitude of those contacts is more than
sufficient for due process purposes, and that the use
tax is related to the benefits Quill receives from
access to the state.’’38
The Quill decision thus resolved any doubt about
whether the due process clause prevents the exercise
of a state’s regulatory or taxing powers over out-of-
state retailers who sell to a significant number of
in-state residents. It is yet to be determined exactly
what magnitude of sales to in-state residents is re-
quired to satisfy the due process clause. Neverthe-
less, it seems clear that the due process clause does
not prevent states from subjecting major e-commerce
vendors to use taxes, even when the vendors do not
have a physical presence within the state.39 To com-
ply with the due process clause, a state or local taxing
jurisdiction need only exempt from its use tax those
remote vendors whose sales within the jurisdiction
fall below some minimal threshold.40
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Just as Quill removed a potential limitation to
state taxing power based on the due process clause,
it fortified another restriction based on the dormant
commerce clause. The Court has long held that the
power granted to Congress to ‘‘regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several
States’’41 can prevent the states from interfering
with interstate commerce even in the absence of
congressional action.42 This ‘‘dormant’’ or ‘‘negative’’
commerce clause, first recognized by Justice Herbert
32Id. at 305. Thus, even if Congress passed legislation
permitting states to require e-tailers to collect a use tax for
sales to in-state residents, the states’ exercise of that author-
ity must be consistent with the due process clause.
33Id. at 307.
34Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211 (1960).
35See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985) (‘‘[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.’’ (citing Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
36Quill, 504 U.S. at 303.
37Id. at 302.
38Id. at 308.
39Id. (‘‘The requirements of due process are met irrespec-
tive of a corporation’s lack of physical presence in the taxing
State. Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated
that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a
State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we
overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the
law of due process.’’)
40State Amazon laws thus generally apply only to out-of-
state vendors that conduct more than some threshold level of
sales to in-state residents. See e.g., N.Y. Tax Law section
1101(b)(8)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 2011) (‘‘A person shall be
presumed to be regularly or systematically soliciting business
in this state if . . . the cumulative total of such person’s gross
receipts from sales of property delivered in this state exceeds
three hundred thousand dollars and such person made more
than one hundred sales of property delivered in this state.’’);
Colo. Code Regs section 39-21-112.3.5(1)(a)(iii) (2010) (provid-
ing that ‘‘[a] ‘retailer that does not collect Colorado sales tax’
does not include a retailer whose sales in Colorado are de
minimis,’’ and that de minimis sales are presumed when the
retailer makes ‘‘less than $100,000 in total gross sales in
Colorado in the prior calendar year’’).
41U.S. Const. art. I, section 8, cl. 3.
42Quill, 504 U.S. at 309.
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A. Johnson in Gibbons v. Ogden,43 imposes special
restrictions on the states’ taxing powers.
The Court’s dormant commerce clause jurispru-
dence has evolved over time to become more permis-
sive regarding state taxation. In 1888 the Court held
that ‘‘no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate
commerce in any form.’’44 The Court later narrowed
this holding to prohibit only ‘‘direct burdens on
interstate commerce.’’45 Finally, in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,46 the Court jettisoned the
direct/indirect distinction and shifted the question
to whether a state tax, in substance, ‘‘produces a
forbidden effect’’47 by ‘‘discriminat[ing] against inter-
state commerce.’’48
The Complete Auto decision established a four-
part test that continues to govern the applicability of
the dormant commerce clause to state taxation.49
The Court has relied on this four-part test in almost
every dormant commerce clause challenge to a state
or local tax since Complete Auto was decided in
1977.50 Under the Complete Auto test, a state tax
survives a dormant Commerce Clause challenge if
the tax ‘‘[1] is applied to an activity with a substan-
tial nexus with the taxing state, [2] is fairly appor-
tioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services
provided by the State.’’51
The first prong of the Complete Auto test requires
that a tax be ‘‘applied to an activity with a substan-
tial nexus with the taxing state.’’52 In analyzing the
constitutionality of existing Amazon laws, this first
prong is by far the most important component of the
Complete Auto test. The Quill decision ruled that
vendors without a physical presence in the taxing
state do not have the substantial nexus required by
this first prong.53 In the Court’s words, ‘‘a vendor
whose only contacts with the taxing state are by
mail or common carrier lacks the ‘substantial nexus’
required by the Commerce Clause.’’54 The majority
in Quill justified the physical presence test for nexus
based on stare decisis and on the concern that
allowing states to impose use tax compliance obliga-
tions on remote vendors could burden interstate
commerce by entangling remote vendors in a ‘‘vir-
tual welter of complicated obligations’’ imposed by
the ‘‘Nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions.’’55
The second prong of the Complete Auto test re-
quires that a tax be fairly apportioned.56 Fair appor-
tionment ensures that multistate economic activity
does not become doubly taxed by being subject to the
full taxing regimes of multiple states.57 For in-
stance, state corporate income taxes are considered
fairly apportioned when a state taxes only a portion
of a multistate corporation’s national income based
on what percentage of the corporation’s total sales,
payroll, and property occurs within the state.58 For
state sales and use taxes, fair apportionment is
achieved when either the state in which the vendor
resides or the state in which the customer resides
taxes the transaction; fair apportionment would be
violated if both states taxed the transaction.59
Hence, the Court has held that use taxes are fairly
apportioned when they provide ‘‘a credit . . . for sales
taxes that have been paid in other States.’’60 More
generally, a use tax should fail the fair apportion-
ment test only if it is levied on transactions that
were already subject to a sales or use tax in another
state and it does not offer a credit for sales taxes
paid in other states.61
4322 U.S. 1, 231-232, 239 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
44Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888).
45Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (citing, among other cases, San-
ford v. Poe, 69 F. 546 (6th Cir. 1895), aff’d sub nom. Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897)).
46430 U.S. 274 (1977).
47Id. at 288.
48Id. at 287.
49Id. at 297.
50Bradley Joondeph, ‘‘Rethinking the Role of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in State Tax Jurisdiction,’’ 24 Va. Tax Rev.
109, 117 (2004).
51Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992)
(quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
279 (1977)).
52Id.
53Id.
54Id.
55Id. at 313 n.6 (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759-760 (1967)).
56Id. at 311.
57Bradley W. Joondeph, ‘‘The Meaning of Fair Apportion-
ment and the Prohibition on Extraterritorial State Taxation’’
71 Fordham L. Rev. 149, 158 (2002); see also Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 186 (1995).
(‘‘We have assessed any threat of malapportionment by ask-
ing whether the tax is internally consistent and, if so,
whether it is externally consistent as well. . . . Internal con-
sistency is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to
the one in question by every other State would add no burden
to interstate commerce that intrastate commerce would not
also bear. . . . External consistency, on the other hand, looks
not to the logical consequences of cloning, but to the economic
justification for the State’s claim upon the value taxed, to
discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of
value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within
the taxing State’’ [internal quotation marks omitted].)
58Elliott Dubin, ‘‘Changes in State Corporate Tax Appor-
tionment Formulas and Tax Bases,’’ States Tax Notes, Feb. 22,
2010, p. 563, Doc 2010-899, or 2010 STT 34-2; Joondeph,
supra note 50, at 117.
59Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 190; Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
supra note 22, at 492-493; Swain, supra note 23, at 438.
60D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988).
61The typical approach for ensuring that use taxes are
fairly apportioned is to levy the use tax only on transactions
that were not subject to sales or use taxes in other states.
Washington’s use tax, for example, applies only when goods
‘‘are purchased in another state that does not have a sales tax
or a state with a sales tax lower than Washington’s.’’ ‘‘Use
Tax,’’ supra note 20.
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The third prong of the Complete Auto test re-
quires that a tax ‘‘not discriminate against inter-
state commerce.’’62 A use tax should generally satisfy
this prong as long as the rate of the use tax does not
exceed the sales or use tax rate that would apply to
an intrastate sale.63 Indeed, the Court held that a
Louisiana use tax satisfied the nondiscrimination
test because the tax ‘‘was designed to compensate
the State for revenue lost when residents purchase
out-of-state goods for use within the state’’ and the
rate of the tax was ‘‘equal to the sales tax applicable
to the same tangible personal property purchased
in-state.’’64 A properly designed use tax should thus
have no trouble satisfying the nondiscrimination
requirement.
The fourth prong of the Complete Auto test re-
quires that a tax be ‘‘fairly related to the services
provided by the State.’’65 This fourth prong ‘‘is
closely connected to the first prong of the Complete
Auto Transit test.’’66 Beyond the substantial nexus
requirement of the first prong, the fourth prong
‘‘imposes the additional limitation that the measure
of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of
the [taxpayer’s] contact’’ with the state.67 The Court
has repeatedly interpreted this fourth prong as
being met when a tax is measured as a percentage of
some proxy for the value of the taxpayer’s economic
activity occurring within the state.68 However, as
long as a tax is measured based on some proxy for
the value of the services a taxpayer receives from a
state, the Court has declined to inquire into the
appropriate level or rate of the tax based on that
proxy, ruling that determinations about the appro-
priate levels of taxation must be made by the politi-
cal process.69 Regarding use taxes, an interstate sale
jointly benefits from the services provided by the
state in which the vendor resides and the state in
which the customer resides.70 Consequently, a use
tax should meet the fourth prong of the Complete
Auto test as long as the tax applies only to transac-
tions that were not subject to a sales or use tax in
another state or if the tax allows a credit for sales or
use taxes paid to another state.71
In sum, only the physical presence requirement of
the first prong of the Complete Auto test prevents
states from imposing use tax compliance obligations
on the major e-commerce vendors. A properly de-
signed use tax can avoid any due process concerns as
long as it exempts remote vendors who conduct less
than some minimal amount of sales within the state.
Likewise, a properly designed use tax can avoid any
other commerce clause concerns — beyond those
arising from the nexus requirement — as long as it
(1) applies a tax rate to interstate transactions no
higher than the sales or use tax rate that applies to
intrastate transactions and (2) either exempts
transactions that were already subject to a sales or
use tax in another state or else offers a credit for any
sales or use taxes paid to another state.
The States’ ‘Amazon’ Laws
Frustrated by Quill and desperate for revenue, the
states have become increasingly aggressive in at-
tempting to tax interstate e-commerce. As of June
2012 at least 12 states have passed ‘‘Amazon’’ laws
designed to collect use taxes from remote vendors.72
These laws have been described by other commen-
tators as unconstitutional, ineffective, or both,73 and
they have been the subject of litigation across the
nation.74
62Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977).
63Id. at 313.
64D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. at 32.
65Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
66Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609,
625-626 (1981).
67Id. at 626.
68E.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S.
175, 198-199 (1995); Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 447
U.S. 207, 228 (1989) (finding that Wisconsin demonstrated
fair apportionment of a tax and that the tax was fairly related
to state services such as ‘‘police and fire protection, the benefit
of a trained work force, and ‘the advantages of a civilized
society’’’ (quoting Japan Line Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434, 445 (1979))); Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at
626.
69Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 626.
70See John A. Swain, ‘‘State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective,’’ 45 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 319, 344-45 (2003). (‘‘It is well-settled that state power to
tax can arise both from residence and source. . . . The funda-
mental rationale for allowing states to tax income with an
in-state source is that the state provides benefits and protec-
tions that allow the income to arise in the first instance.’’)
71See D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 32
(1988) (holding that a use tax is fairly related to the benefits
provided by the state because it is related to the services
provided by the state, such as the state’s provision of mass
transit and public roads for the benefit of the vendor’s
customers). Arguably, a use tax that fails the substantial
nexus requirement of the first prong of the Complete Auto test
might also fail the fourth prong. But there can be no doubt
that interstate sales benefit from services provided by the
state in which the customer resides, as the various benefits
provided by that state create the framework within which the
customer was able to earn funds to make the purchase.
72See infra note 76 and accompanying text. Because of the
difficulty of determining what should properly be counted as
an Amazon law, we have not updated our survey to account
for new state legislation after May 2012.
73See, e.g., Kranz, Smith, and Freeman, supra note 11, at
55 (unconstitutional); Zelinsky, ‘‘New York’s ‘Amazon’ Law,’’
supra note 11, at 715 (ineffective); Zelinsky, ‘‘The Siren Song,’’
supra note 11, at 695 (unconstitutional).
74See, e.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-
REB-CBS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9589 (D. Colo. Jan. 26,
2011); Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Dep’t of Tax’n &
Fin., 13 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
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New York passed the first Amazon law in 2008.75
At least 11 additional states have since followed
New York’s lead.76 The action became particularly
intense during the summer of 2011 with both Cali-
fornia77 and Texas78 passing new Amazon legisla-
tion. A number of other state legislatures have also
been debating their own Amazon laws.79 Even if the
states conclude that these laws are unlikely to be
successful, passing them can help the states muddle
through their current-year budget crises as long as
the laws can be scored as generating additional
revenues.80
Although there is considerable variation in the
content of the states’ Amazon laws, current legisla-
tion can be roughly categorized into three different
approaches: referrer-nexus, related-entity nexus,
and information-reporting requirements. Previous
scholars have analyzed these Amazon laws in
depth;81 we will not repeat their efforts here. In-
stead, we aim only to outline some of the major
features of these laws to demonstrate why the laws
are unlikely to succeed in enabling the states to tax
interstate e-commerce.82
The referrer-nexus approach presumes that a
vendor has a physical presence within a state when-
ever the vendor makes sales and marketing ar-
rangements with in-state residents. Referrer-nexus
statutes typically trigger use tax liability for a
remote vendor if two conditions are satisfied. First,
the remote vendor must have some agreement with
in-state residents under which the in-state residents
directly or indirectly refer potential customers —
‘‘whether by a link on an internet website or other-
wise’’ — to the vendor for some consideration.83
Second, the ‘‘cumulative gross receipts’’ from sales to
in-state residents made by all those referrals must
exceed some amount in the previous year —
75Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 57 pt. OO-1, 2008 N.Y. Laws
2844 (codified at N.Y. Tax Law section 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKin-
ney 2011)); N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., supra note
9, at 2.
76Harley Duncan and Sarah McGahan, ‘‘An Overview of
Recent Sales and Use Tax Legislation,’’ State Tax Notes, Aug.
22, 2011, p. 483, Doc 2011-17205, or 2011 STT 162-2 (listing
the states that have passed Amazon laws: Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, and
Vermont); see also Stephen P. Kranz, Lisbeth A. Freeman, and
Mark W. Yopp, ‘‘Is Quill Dead? At Least One State Has
Written the Obituary,’’ State Tax Notes, Aug. 2, 2010, p. 307,
Doc 2010-16154, or 2010 STT 147-1 (listing Alabama, Geor-
gia, Minnesota, and Wisconsin as states that have passed
Amazon laws); Robert D. Plattner, Daniel Smirlock, and Mary
Ellen Ladouceur, ‘‘A New Way Forward for Remote Vendor
Sales Tax Collection,’’ State Tax Notes, Jan. 18, 2010, p. 187,
Doc 2009-28458, or 2010 STT 11-2 (listing Alabama, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, and Wisconsin as states that
have passed Amazon laws).
Our preliminary research suggests that as many as 16
states may have passed Amazon laws as of May 2012,
including Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. However, one might question whether the legisla-
tion enacted by some of those states should be counted as
Amazon laws, and some of those states may repeal their
Amazon laws if they reach compromises with major
e-commerce vendors (such as Amazon). See infra note 111.
77Karen Setze and John Buhl, ‘‘California Governor Signs
‘Amazon’ Law,’’ State Tax Notes, July 7, 2011, Doc 2011-1480,
or 2011 STT 126-2.
78Billy Hamilton, ‘‘How Amazon’s Texas Deal Unraveled,’’
State Tax Notes, July 18, 2011, p. 191, Doc 2011-14671, or
2011 STT 137-2.
79Billy Hamilton, ‘‘The Empire Strikes Back: Amazon
Fights Against Online Tax Efforts,’’ State Tax Notes, June 27,
2011, p. 959, Doc 2011-13071, or 2011 STT 123-4 (‘‘Another 10
states are considering or have recently considered similar
legislation — Arizona, California, Hawaii, Louisiana, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Ver-
mont.’’); see also Dolores W. Gregory and Nancy J. Moore, ‘‘As
States Crank Up Efforts to Force Use Tax Collection, Amazon
Threatens to Shutter Operations in Texas and California,’’
BNA Daily Tax Report, Mar. 22, 2011, No. 55, at J-1 (describ-
ing proposed and actual legislation by Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, Okla-
homa, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and
Vermont).
80For a general discussion of how states muddle through
budget crises, see David Gamage, ‘‘Preventing State Budget
Crises, Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem,’’ 98 Calif. L.
Rev. 749, 754-768 (2010).
81E.g., Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, ‘‘Amazon’s Arguments Against Collecting Sales
Taxes Do Not Withstand Scrutiny,’’ (2010), available at http://
www.cbpp.org/files/11-16-09sfp.pdf; Andrew Haile, ‘‘Defend-
ing Colorado’s Use Tax Reporting Requirement,’’ State Tax
Notes, Sept. 20, 2010, p. 761, Doc 2010-16462, or 2010 STT
181-1; Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 557.
82Ultimately, we believe that only our proposed solution of
adequate vendor compensation — described in our companion
article — offers the states an effective way forward in their
attempts to preserve their sales and use tax bases against the
erosion caused by the growth of e-commerce. See, e.g., Zelin-
sky, supra note 10, at 578. (‘‘Why are Amazon laws suddenly
proliferating as they are now? At one level, that proliferation
seems particularly quixotic, given the unconstitutionality and
futility of these state laws.’’)
83N.Y. Tax Law section 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2011). It
appears that the state may chain those connections back to
the remote vendor, even if the remote vendor contracts solely
with another out-of-state business that in turn contracts with
an in-state business. See N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation and
Fin., supra note 9, at 2.
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$10,000, in the case of New York’s statute.84 These
statutes provide that remote vendors who have
those agreements are presumed to be soliciting sales
through in-state residents85 and therefore are sub-
ject to the state’s use tax.
The referrer-nexus approach is sometimes called
the affiliate tax approach86 or the click-through
nexus87 approach. The first state Amazon law —
passed by New York in 2008 — relied on that ap-
proach,88 and many of the later state Amazon laws
have done the same.89 New York’s referrer-nexus
statute provides that a vendor can rebut the pre-
sumption of physical presence if it can prove that ‘‘the
resident with whom the seller has an agreement did
not engage in any solicitation in the state on behalf
of the seller that would satisfy the nexus requirement
of the United States constitution.’’90 The litigation91
surrounding New York’s statute consequently cen-
tered on the statute’s application — in particular,
whether a remote vendor may be subject to use taxa-
tion if the vendor’s only solicitation activities within
the state are compensating in-state residents for
linking to the vendor on the residents’ websites.92
Even if Amazon loses its constitutional challenge
to New York’s statute, we expect that the referrer-
nexus approach will still prove ineffective. Over-
stock.com has already suspended its relationships
with marketing associates in New York in order to
avoid being subject to New York’s use tax.93 Amazon
has similarly suspended relationships with market-
ing associates in other states that have passed
referrer-nexus laws.94 Presumably, the only reason
that Amazon has not also done so in New York is to
maintain standing to challenge New York’s stat-
ute.95 If Amazon loses the litigation it likely will
respond by terminating all click-through marketing
relationships with New York residents so as to
remain exempt from New York’s use tax.96 The
referrer-nexus approach ultimately fails as a way
forward for the states to tax e-commerce for the
simple reason that e-commerce vendors can easily
end all referral relationships with in-state residents.
Similar in many ways to the referrer-nexus ap-
proach, the related-entity-nexus approach attempts
to satisfy the commerce clause’s nexus requirement
by attributing physical presence to remote vendors
that have specific business relationships with in-
state firms. The approach is sometimes called the
affiliate-nexus approach.97 Under either name, the
approach involves triggering a remote vendor’s use
tax liability under one of two circumstances: (1) if
the remote vendor controls or is controlled by an
in-state business or is under common control with
an in-state business,98 or (2) if the remote vendor
and an in-state business ‘‘use an identical or sub-
stantially similar name, tradename, trademark, or
84N.Y. Tax Law section 1101(b)(8)(vi).
85Section 1101(b)(8)(vi) creates a presumption that out-of-
staters are soliciting sales through in-state residents if its
requirements are met. See id. The presumption appears
definitional, however, and is likely difficult to rebut unless the
out-of-state business can prove that it should fit within the
statutory exclusion.
86See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 9, at 309.
87See, e.g., Kranz, Freeman, and Yopp, supra note 76, at
309.
88See supra note 75.
89See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws section 44-18-15(a)(2) (2010);
N.C. Gen. Stat. section 105-164.8(b)(3) (2009).
90N.Y. Tax Law section 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2011).
91The New York Appellate Division recently upheld New
York’s statute as facially constitutional. Amazon.com, LLC v.
N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2010). However, the question remains to be decided on
remand as to whether the statute can constitutionally be
applied to major e-commerce vendors like Amazon. Zelinsky,
supra note 15, at 104. And Amazon will undoubtedly appeal if
it loses the as-applied challenge. According to Zelinsky, ‘‘Ul-
timately, this controversy is likely to play out before the U.S.
Supreme Court.’’ Id. at 93. See also Performance Marketing
Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamer, No. 2011 CH 26333 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty.
May 7, 2012) (finding Illinois’s click-through nexus law un-
constitutional).
92Guidance by New York’s Department of Taxation and
Finance indicates that an in-state resident’s linking to the
remote vendor’s website without any other ‘‘solicitation activ-
ity in the state targeted at potential New York State cus-
tomers on behalf of the seller’’ does not on its own trigger the
vendor’s being subject to use taxation. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Taxation and Fin., supra note 9, at 4. That language, however,
appears inconsistent with one of the accompanying examples,
which describes a remote vendor that enters into an agree-
ment with a service provider, who in turn contracts with New
York state residents to refer potential customers back to the
remote vendor. The referrals take the form of ‘‘placing [the
vendor’s] product links on their Web sites,’’ with commissions
paid by the service provider for sales made through those
links. Id. at 3. The example concludes that the remote vendor
is presumed to be soliciting sales through in-state residents.
Id. at 4. Later guidance provided another safe harbor, under
which remote vendors could rebut the nexus presumption by
including in their referral agreements a provision prohibiting
their in-state representatives from ‘‘engaging in solicitation
activities in New York.’’ N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation and Fin.,
‘‘Additional Information on How Sellers May Rebut the New
Presumption Applicable to the Definition of Sales Tax Vendor
as Described in TSB-M-08(3)S, TSB-M-08(3.1)S,’’ at 1 (2008).
This safe harbor requires the in-state residents to certify
annually that they have not engaged in any prohibited
solicitation during the prior year. Id.
93Zelinsky, supra note 15, at 102.
94E.g., Joe Hanel, ‘‘Amazon Drops Colorado Affiliates in
Response to Law,’’ State Tax Notes, Mar. 12, 2012, p. 735, Doc
2012-4986, or 2010 STT 45-5. 735 (2010); Geoffrey A. Fowler,
‘‘Corporate News: Amazon Cuts North Carolina Affiliates to
Avoid Tax,’’ The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2009, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB124603593605261787.html.
95Zelinsky, supra note 15, at 102.
96Id.
97 Swain, supra note 23, at 419.
98See, e.g., Ala. Code section 40-23-190(a)(1)-(3), (b)(1)
(2003).
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goodwill, to develop, promote, or maintain sales’’99 or
otherwise substantially coordinate their business
practices. In effect, the related-entity-nexus ap-
proach attempts to circumvent the commerce
clause’s prohibitions by disregarding corporate
structure and treating related business entities as
though they were a single unitary business. States
that have passed legislation based on the related-
entity-nexus approach include Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Minne-
sota, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin.100
The referrer-nexus approach
ultimately fails as a way forward
for the states to tax e-commerce
for the simple reason that
e-commerce vendors can easily
end all referral relationships with
in-state residents.
Like the referrer-nexus approach, the related-
entity-nexus approach may be ‘‘constitutionally sus-
pect.’’101 Stephen Kranz, Lisbeth Freeman, and
Mark Yopp argue, ‘‘Nowhere does the Constitution,
or the cases applying it, give support to the idea that
two retailers that are simply members of the same
controlled group of corporations create nexus for
each other.’’102 In contrast, John Swain argues, ‘‘Al-
though no Supreme Court decision has addressed
directly the issue of affiliate nexus, the Court has
[addressed related concepts] which serve as building
blocks for a theory of affiliate nexus.’’103 He thus
concludes that ‘‘states should feel unconstrained in
enforcing sales tax collection obligations against
companies currently attempting to avoid taxation
through entity isolation techniques.’’104 As those
competing views indicate, there is no consensus
about the constitutionality of the related-entity-
nexus approach, and litigation remains ongoing.105
We do not believe that the related-entity-nexus
approach — regardless of its constitutionality —
offers the states an effective means for taxing inter-
state e-commerce. Maintaining their sales and use
tax exemption is sufficiently important to major
e-commerce vendors like Amazon that they can be
expected to terminate most relationships that would
cause them to lose that exemption. Alternatively,
e-commerce vendors can move their subsidiaries or
other related entities out of the states that pass
related-entity-nexus statutes. As evidence of that
willingness, Amazon has previously threatened to
close warehouses and other facilities in several
states.106
Some e-commerce vendors may place sufficient
importance on maintaining their related operations
within the states in which they now operate that
they will remain subject to related-entity-nexus
statutes. But we predict that many e-commerce
vendors will go to extreme lengths to reorganize
their operations in order to maintain their sales and
use tax exemption, once the vendors have exhausted
litigation and alternative options for challenging
those statutes. For instance, The Wall Street Jour-
nal has reported that Amazon originally located in
Washington state, rather than in California, to avoid
being subject to California’s sales tax.107 And Ama-
zon has continued to aggressively manage its busi-
ness operations so as to avoid being subject to the
sales and use taxes of major customer states.108
California’s recently passed Amazon law at-
tempted to subject Amazon to use taxation based on
the related-entity-nexus strategy because Amazon
maintains a subsidiary in California responsible for
developing the Kindle e-book reader.109 Conse-
quently, Amazon challenged California’s Amazon
law both through litigation and by sponsoring a
referendum to overturn the law.110 Amazon later
99Id. section 40-23-190(a)(2).
100Kranz, Freeman, and Yopp, supra note 76, at 311;
Plattner, Smirlock, and Ladouceur, supra note 76, at 194
101Kranz, Freeman, and Yopp, supra note 76, at 311.
102Id. at 309; see also Edward Zelinsky, ‘‘California’s Once
and Future Amazon Law,’’ State Tax Notes, Oct. 10, 2011, p.
83, Doc 2011-19694, or 2011 STT 196-1. (‘‘As a constitutional
matter, common ownership is not a substitute for physical
presence in the taxing state.’’)
103Swain, supra note 23, at 424.
104Id.
105Gregory and Moore, supra note 79. (‘‘Whether Amazon’s
position will be upheld in court is an open question.’’)
106E.g., Bill Kidd, ‘‘Amazon Closing Texas Facility Over
Sales Tax Dispute,’’ State Tax Notes, Feb 21, 2011, p. 519, Doc
2011-3091, or 2011 STT 30-22.
107Stu Woo, ‘‘Amazon Battles States Over Sales Tax,’’ The
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 3, 2011, at A1. (‘‘Amazon’s Mr. Bezos
has said he established the company in Washington partly
because it has a tech-savvy but relatively small population, so
state taxes wouldn’t affect many potential customers.’’)
108Id. (‘‘Former Amazon staffers say the tactic is typical of
its aggressive approach to minimizing sales tax. Early em-
ployees recall requirements to consult lawyers before arrang-
ing trips to states including California. Former staffers say
they got grilled about the purpose of trips and warned to
avoid soliciting new customers, promoting products and doing
similar activities in certain states because of tax concerns.’’);
see also Mazerov, supra note 81, at 6-7 (discussing Amazon’s
history of aggressive tax planning).
109Laura Mahoney, ‘‘Retailers, Lawyers, Regulators,
Scramble to Interpret ‘Amazon’ Law,’’ Daily Tax Rep. (Bureau
of Nat’l Affairs, Arlington, Va.), July 6, 2011, No. 83, at H-2.
Amazon actually has two subsidiaries in California —
A9.com, Inc. and Lab126. Zelinsky, supra note 102, at 83.
110Karen Setze, ‘‘Amazon Wants Repeal of California’s
Click-Through Law,’’ State Tax Notes, July 18, 2011, p. 151
Doc 2011-15212, or 2011 STT 134-2. See also Zelinsky, supra
note 102, at 83.
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said as part of a deal with the state that it might
voluntarily collect sales tax on its California sales
after a year-long exemption period.111 Exactly what
Amazon has committed itself to as part of this deal
is unclear; Amazon has withdrawn its referendum,
but Amazon may still have the option of challenging
the California statute in court or moving its opera-
tions out of state after the end of the yearlong
exemption period. Yet even if Amazon does even-
tually comply with California’s related-entity-nexus
statute, the related-entity-nexus approach seems
less likely to succeed for states other than California
that lack unique regions like Silicon Valley that
might deter the major e-commerce vendors from
moving all of their operations out of state.112
The final method by which states have attempted
to tax sales by remote vendors to in-state residents —
the ‘‘information-reporting requirements’’ approach
— does not involve taxing the remote vendors at all.
Rather, the approach involves requiring remote ven-
dors to divulge information about the vendors’ sales
to in-state residents necessary for the state to effec-
tively collect use taxes from the state’s residents.113
Notice and reporting requirements facilitate the
collection of use taxes in a manner similar to how
W-2s facilitate income tax collection. The informa-
tion reported has to contain only the total amount of
a resident’s purchases and some information ca-
pable of uniquely identifying the resident (such as
an address). The most well-known state attempt to
impose notice and reporting requirements is Colo-
rado’s HB 10-1193, which imposes three separate
requirements on remote vendors that do not volun-
tarily collect use taxes on sales to Colorado resi-
dents.114 First, those vendors must include a notice
on invoices sent to Colorado purchasers informing
them that use tax may be due to Colorado’s Depart-
ment of Revenue.115 Second, the vendors must pro-
vide a year-end summary of all sales to Colorado
residents who purchased $500 or more of taxable
items in the previous year.116 Finally, and most
crucially, the vendors must provide the Colorado
DOR with an annual summary of purchases made
by Colorado residents and the aggregate amount
that each resident purchased.117 Failure to satisfy
any of those requirements results in a fine, which
ranges from $5,000 to $100,000.118
We do not believe that the
related-entity-nexus approach —
regardless of its constitutionality
— offers the states an effective
means for taxing interstate
e-commerce.
We think that the information-reporting-
requirements approach, unlike the referrer-nexus
and related-entity-nexus approaches, would be
largely successful were it constitutional. However,
we conclude that of the three major approaches, the
information-reporting-requirements approach most
clearly violates the commerce clause and Quill’s
physical presence requirement. As Zelinsky argues,
‘‘Six thousand different state and local reporting re-
quirements would constitute the same ‘welter of com-
plicated obligations’ as an equivalent number of con-
flicting tax collection responsibilities.’’119 If we take
the Quill decision seriously that the purpose of the
physical presence requirement is to prevent the ex-
cess burden on remote vendors that might result
from numerous taxing jurisdictions imposing tax
compliance obligations, the physical presence rule
should also apply to information-reporting require-
ments.
111See Stu Woo, ‘‘Amazon to Collect California Sales Tax by
2013,’’ The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 28, 2011, http://on
line.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576598883
358407422.html. For further examples of compromises be-
tween states and Amazon concerning sales tax collection, see,
e.g., Karen Setze, ‘‘Tennessee Governor Announces Amazon
Agreement,’’ State Tax Notes, Oct. 10, 2011, p. 72, Doc
2011-21142, or 2011 STT 195-22. John Buhl, ‘‘Amazon
Reaches Tax Deal With Nevada, Negotiating With Texas,’’
State Tax Notes, Apr. 30, 2012, p. 273, Doc 2012-8704, or 2012
STT 80-1; John Buhl, ‘‘Virginia Governor Approves Amazon
Sales Tax Deal,’’ State Tax Notes, Apr. 9, 2012, p. 85, Doc
2012-7281, or 2012 STT 67-22. John Buhl, ‘‘New Jersey
Governor, Amazon Reach Collection Agreement,’’ State Tax
Notes, June 4, 2012, p. 676, Doc 2012-11669, or 2012 105-19.
112Amazon and other major e-commerce vendors probably
have to maintain warehouses and other related facilities in at
least some states, but as long as a few geographically dis-
persed states do not pass affiliate-nexus statutes, Amazon
should be able to cease operations in those states that do pass
those statutes. The states face a holdout problem in attempt-
ing to cooperate to prevent Amazon from moving operations to
states that do not attempt to enforce affiliate-nexus laws. We
expect that a sufficient number of states will be willing to
continue granting Amazon and other major e-commerce ven-
dors use tax exemptions in order to lure warehousing and
other business operations. For small states, the benefit of
having those operations moved to within the state can easily
exceed the revenue lost from granting use tax exemptions.
113E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. section 39-21-112(3.5) (2011); AB
155 section 3, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
114The vendor must first be considered a retailer doing
business within the state in order to be subject to notice and
reporting requirements. See Colo. Rev. Stat. section 39-26-
102(8) (2011); id. section 39-21-112(3.5)(c), (d) (requiring
retailers that do not collect Colorado use tax to satisfy the
notice and reporting requirements).
115See Colo. Reg. 39-21-112.3.5(2) (2010).
116Id. 39-21-112.3.5(3)(c).
117Id. 39-21-112.3.5(4).
118Id. 39-21-112.3.5(2)(f)(i), (4)(f)(ii)(3).
119Zelinsky, ‘‘The Siren Song,’’ supra note 11, at 698.
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Haile has argued that information-reporting re-
quirements are ‘‘significantly less onerous than the
burden of actually collecting use taxes.’’120 That may
be so,121 but Quill’s bright-line rule was designed so
thatneithercourtsnor legislatureswould inquire into
the magnitude of the burden on interstate com-
merce.122 Haile has also argued that information-
reporting requirements should be evaluated as regu-
lations rather than as taxes, so that Quill’s physical
presence requirement should not apply to
information-reporting requirements.123 Although
that seems plausible, we ultimately are unpersuaded.
The sole purpose of imposing information-reporting
requirements is to support a use tax regime. Given
that the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
analysis of sales and use taxes under the commerce
clause is to be based on ‘‘practical effects’’124 and
‘‘economic realities’’125 rather than on ‘‘formalism,’’126
we think it unlikely that lower courts would uphold a
measure such as information-reporting requirements
that has nearly identical practical effects and eco-
nomic realities to requiring the actual collection of use
taxes. Ultimately, unless the information-reporting-
requirements approach is combined with our pro-
posed solution of adequate vendor compensation, we
expect courts to conclude that imposing information-
reportingrequirementsfailsQuill’sphysicalpresence
test. As Zelinsky concludes, ‘‘Haile’s characterization
of the Colorado Amazon law as tax-related but never-
theless a ‘nontax’ law [is unhelpful]. . . . It is more
persuasive to characterize tax reporting laws as tax
laws, subject to the dormant commerce clause con-
straints on tax laws.’’127
Of the three major approaches, the
information-reporting-requirements
approach most clearly violates the
commerce clause and Quill’s
physical presence requirement.
For those reasons, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado has permanently enjoined the
enforcement of Colorado’s information-reporting re-
quirements.128 In finding the law unconstitutional,
the court held that ‘‘the information reporting obli-
gations of the Colorado Amazon statute are indistin-
guishable from the responsibility to collect tax.’’129
Although litigation remains ongoing, we are skepti-
cal that the courts will allow states to tax interstate
e-commerce using the information-reporting-
requirements approach, unless that approach is
combined with our proposed solution of adequate
vendor compensation.130
Conclusion
We think it likely that the current attempts by
state governments to tax remote e-commerce ven-
dors such as Amazon will be unsuccessful, either
because major e-commerce vendors will sever (or
have severed) their ties with those states that pass
Amazon laws or because such laws will be held
unconstitutional. Thus, states desiring to tax sales
by remote vendors to in-state residents should con-
sider alternative modifications to their sales and use
tax regimes. We propose one promising alternative
approach in our forthcoming companion article.131✰
120Haile, supra note 81, at 764. But see Zelinsky, ‘‘The
Siren Song,’’ supra note 11, at 698 (questioning Haile’s argu-
ment).
121However, to comply with information-reporting require-
ments, a remote vendor must know each taxing jurisdiction’s
rules for tax-exempt sales, sales tax holidays, and product
coding. And ‘‘determining how to handle tax-exempt sales,
sales tax holidays, and product taxability coding can be a
daunting task, particularly for small and midsize businesses.
It has been estimated that sales tax exemptions account for
60 percent of the cost of compliance for small businesses.’’
Cara Griffith, ‘‘Streamlining Versus ‘Amazon’ Laws: The
Remote Seller Dilemma,’’ State Tax Notes, Feb. 1, 2010, p.
351, Doc 2010-1816, or 2010 STT 20-6.
122Although Quill acknowledged that the physical pres-
ence rule, ‘‘like other bright-line tests[,] . . . appears artificial
at its edges,’’ the Quill majority nonetheless concluded that
‘‘this artificiality . . . is more than offset by the benefits of a
clear rule.’’ 504 U.S. at 315. By adopting the clear, bright-line
physical presence rule, the Quill majority hoped to reduce
litigation and to avoid the ‘‘quagmire’’ and ‘‘confusion’’ that
might otherwise arise in the absence of ‘‘precise guides to the
States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxa-
tion.’’ Id. at 315-316 (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-458 (1959)).
123Haile, supra note 81, at 763-764.
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(1977).
125Id.
126Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992).
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128Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
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130For further discussion, see David Gamage and Darien
Shanske, ‘‘The Saga of State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Reflections on
the Colorado Decision,’’ State Tax Notes, July 16, 2012, p. 197,
Doc 2012-13634, or 2012 STT 136-4.
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